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A Second Look At The Suez Canal Cases:
Excuse For Nonperformance Of
Contractual Obligations In The
Light Of Economic Theory
By ROBERT L. BImiMNGHAm*
Take the area of relief available in cases where impossibility or mu-
tual mistake excuses performance by both parties. We have almost
totally failed to work out a system that satisfies anyone for dis-
tributing the wide variety of losses (including lost expectations)
caused by events which, by definition, are the fault of neither
party.... [P3erhaps, the courts have managed to reach the best
solutions on an individual case basis by the seat of their pants. It is
at least open to doubt.
-Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact
and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wisconsin Law Re-
view 833, 836-37.
I. Excuse Doctrines: Rationale
EACH party to a contract normally enters it expecting benefit
from the resulting relationship. Such undertakings are consensual;
presumably one would not agree if gain were not anticipated. Since
the future cannot be known with certainty, however, there is a pos-
sibility that loss will occur to at least one of the individuals involved.
Allocation of risk, as well as division of joint benefit, is of course a
function of the bargaining strengths of the parties.
The distribution of losses that no doubt appeared highly un-
likely at the time of contract formation nevertheless presents a con-
tinuing legal problem. An extreme solution, requiring rigid adher-
ence to the express terms of the agreement, is illustrated by Paradine
v. Jane,' decided by the King's Bench in 1647. Here a claim for
rent by a landlord was met by the assertion that "a certain German
prince, by name Prince Rupert, an alien born, enemy to the King
and kingdom, had invaded the realm with an hostile army of men;
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. Pro-
fessor Harold J. Berman of the Harvard Law School has been of great help
to me in the preparation of this paper. He is, however, in no way respon-
sible for the views I express.
1 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
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and with the same force did enter upon the defendant's possession,
and him expelled .... "2 The court held this plea insufficient, stat-
ing that "when the party by his own contract creates a duty or
charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, not-
withstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might
have provided against it by his contract."3
An opposite approach is common in Japan. Here a party to a
contract seldom seeks to enforce it if it has ceased to be mutually
advantageous: "[B]usiness and social custom forbids one to terminate
a harmonious social tie by selfishly insisting on one's own interests."4
Thus there is a "tendency to use legal forms-for example, the
signing of a business contract-when the parties do not contemplate
the regulation of the relationship thus initiated by formal legal stand-
ards, but rather seek a pattern of continuing association in which
adjustment will be responsive to considerations the law ignores."5
2 Id. at 897.
3 Id. American reports are not without examples of similar inflexibility.
E.g., Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494 (1874): "The general principle of law
which underlies this case is well established. If a man bind himself, by a
positive, express contract, to do an act in itself possible, he must perform
his engagement, unless prevented by the act of God, the law, or the other
party to the contract. No hardship, no unforeseen hindrance, no difficulty
short of absolute impossibility, will excuse him from doing what he has ex-
pressly agreed to do. This doctrine may sometimes seem to bear heavily
upon contractors; but, in such cases, the hardship is attributable, not to the
law, but to the contractor himself, who has improvidently assumed an ab-
solute, when he might have undertaken only a qualified, liability. The
law does no more than enforce the contract as the parties themselves
have made it." Id. at 503-04.
4 Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAw ml
JAPAx 41, 47 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963).
5 von Mehren, Some Reflections on Japanese Law, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1486,
1494 (1958). "Even in the cattle contracts, which are the most developed
aspect of Sebei law, one can be guilty of trying to force too closely the limits
of legal demand. The Sebei themselves recognize the existence of conditions
that are not enforceable, but which would be honored under the proper cir-
cumstances-a twilight zone at the edges of legal obligations. This is not
merely a disagreement over details (though that occurs too), but a consensus
that a person really ought to do things he is not obligated to do." W.
GoLnsclnvIxr, SEBEI LAW 6 (1967). The Standard Stipulated Terms for Con-
tracts for Work in Construction Projects, issued by the Central Construction
Industry Council, include the following provisions: "(1) A [the person placing
the order], in case it is necessary to do so, may alter the content of the work,
or either suspend or discontinue the work. In this case, if it is necessary to
alter the fees for the independent work or the time of completion, A and B
[the contractor] are to confer and settle these matters in writing. (2) In the
case of the prior paragraph, if B has sustained damage, A shall compensate
him for this damage. The amount of compensation is to be determined by
conferral between A and B." See Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Con-
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Modern Western doctrines of excuse for nonperformance of con-
tractual obligations fall between these two boundary solutions. They
seek to avoid the inflexibility of a rule requiring literal reading of
agreements without adding undue uncertainty as to the extent of
obligations assumed. Their common consequence is "the operation of
the law in discharging a contract by reason of the occurrence of
events or circumstances which were not within the contemplation of
the parties when making it, and which are of such a character that
to hold the parties to their contract would be to impose a new con-
tract upon them .... 6 English decisions evidence an almost unin-
terrupted retreat from early requirements of strict compliance with
the express terms of an agreement to a present willingness to ad-
just rights and duties in the face of major unforeseen changes in
circumstances. Most American courts, on the other hand, have been
much less liberal in their use of the available doctrines.
American commentators frequently dissociate impossibility of
performance, usually defined to include not only physicial impossibil-
ity but also illegality and unreasonable difficulty, from frustration
of purpose: The latter is thought to occur when the counter-perform-
ance due the party seeking relief has become of little value to him.
Discharge on grounds of impossibility is granted without elaborate in-
quiry when death or illness prevents performance of an obligation
involving personal services; courts have often refused, however, to
extrapolate from such cases to reach a rule authorizing intervention
in other situations where performance is equally precluded by frus-
tration of purpose rather than by "act of God." Seemingly divergent
holdings can be reconciled with this conclusion and with each other
through assumptions concerning implicit allocation of risk by the
contracting parties.
7
Section 288 of the Restatement of Contracts states:
Where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be at-
tained by either party to a contract forms the basis on which both
parties enter into it, and this object or effect is or surely will be
frustrated, a promisor who is without fault in causing the frustration,
and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty of per-
forming his promise unless a contrary intention appears.8
This provision, however, was not declarative of American law at the
time of its formulation and has received little judicial support since.
Anderson, writing in 1953, could find no decision by an American
court of last resort which expressly permitted relief based on frus-
temporary Japan, in LAw iN JAPAN 41, 46-47 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963). See
generally Wren, The Legal System of Pre-Western Japan, 20 HAsTINGS L.J.
217, 224-26 (1968).
6 A. McNAm & A. WATTS, TE LEGAL EFFECTS or WAR 157 (4th ed. 1966).
7 See 6 A. Coaain, CONTRACTS §§ 1319-72 (rev. 1963).
8 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 288 (1932).
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tration; 9 a more recent study reiterates claims of disuse.1 0 Hay
correctly asserts: "The widely-held supposition that the doctrine of
frustration plays a recognized role in American contract law is pri-
marily based not on a study of the case law, but on section 288 of
the Restatement of Contracts. . . . [T] he doctrine . . . is almost un-
used in American law."'"
McNair and Watts divide justifications of judicial interference
receiving some support in English law into five categories:
(a) the theory of an implied term which the law imputes to the
parties, in order to regulate a situation which in the eye of the law
the parties themselves would have regulated by agreement if the
necessity had occurred to them...
(b) the theory of the disappearance of the basis or foundation of
the contract...
(c) Lord Wright's theory to the effect that, the parties not having
dealt with the matter, the Courts must determine what is just, must
find a reasonable solution for them...
(d) the theory of common mistake...
(e) the theory of supervening impossibility.12
Following recent British practice they consider all five theories, in-
cluding that of impossibility, to provide a basis for frustration doc-
trines. This approach appears warranted for most purposes since
both an increase in the difficulty of the performance to be rendered
by an individual and a reduction in the value of the counter-per-
formance he is to receive create a similar disproportion in the rights
and obligations of the parties. Its broader definition of frustration is
used to simplify the succeeding analysis.
The third of the five categories, fairness, is arguably the founda-
tion of all relief; the others may merely designate techniques by
which relief is granted:
[O]ne can almost detect the emergence of a concept of unjust im-
poverishment ....
[T]he court or arbitration tribunal must necessarily ...
make its own determination, independently of intentions manifested
in the contract, of which party should in fairness suffer the loss that
occurred when the unallocated risk materialized.
[ilt is possible to detect ... a theory that goes beyond con-
tract interpretation. There is a suggestion, at least, that the harsh-
ness of contractual arrangements may require the protection of an
9 Anderson, Frustration of a Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DEPAuL
L. REv. 1 (1953).
10 Comment, Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59 MlcH. L. REV. 98
(1960).
11 Hay, Zum Wegfall der Geschfiftsgrundlage im angloamerikanischen
Recht, 164 Ancmv FfiR Dm Civmisrxscnn PRAIs 231, 245, 251 (1964) (transla-
tion by author).
12 A. McNAm & A. WArrs, Tm LEGAL EFFEcTs OF WAR 167 (4th ed. 1966).
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overriding principle. 13
Since frustration remedies can in many cases be applied or with-
held with almost equal justification, they permit the judge some
freedom in allocating gain or loss between contracting parties. Their
primarily redistributive function should not be concealed behind
bland assertions that interpretation of documents is necessarily a
search for true meaning rather than an exercise of judicial discre-
tion.14
Berman has urged judicial renunciation of the frustration option
in limited classes of cases where the contracting parties are suffi-
ciently experienced to protect adequately their own interests. He
suggests that those involved in international trade, for instance,
can best be served by increasing the certainty with which they can
allocate the gains or losses associated with their transactions. Sur-
veying the intrusion of excuse doctrines, he concludes: "Consid-
erations of social policy have been introduced in matters that in the
13 Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Prac-
tices in International Trade, 63 COLUm. L. Ruv. 1413, 1414, 1415-16, 1418
(1963). 'Professor Arthur von Mehren . .. remarks that in English and
American law there are few doctrines dealing with the harshness of a con-
tractual arrangement and that the doctrine of frustration serves this function
and therefore cannot simply be discarded." Id. at 1417 n.9.
14 "There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it
literally ... ." Guiseppie v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (L.
Hand, J.) (concurring opinion), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U.S. 244 (1945). "In the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 24) there
lived in the Pel Commandery a man whose property amounted to more than
200,000 strings of cash. He had one son whose mother died when he was
only three years old; he also had a (married) daughter who was a wicked
woman. When the man fell ill he assembled the members of his clan and
made a testament leaving all the property to his daughter. (To his son) he
bequeathed only a sword, saying: 'When my son shall have reached the age
of fifteen, this sword must be given to him.' Long after (the old man's death,
however,) as the daughter had not given that sword to her brother; he went to
the Grand Administrator. The Grand Master of Works, Ho Wu, examined
the testament, then turned to his assistants and remarked: 'The woman is
violent and domineering, her husband is greedy and low-minded. Therefore,
the old man feared that they would harm his son (if he should leave all the
property to his son), and he let it be taken by his daughter. But in reality he
only deposited the property with her temporarily; for the sword would be the
means whereby a final decision would be reached. He surmised that after
his son would have become fifteen, his intelligence would have sufficiently
developed to enable him to take independent action, and if he reported to the
authorities, (sooner or later some magistrate would interpret correctly the old
man's real intention and) justice would be done. So far ahead (the old man)
planned.' Thereupon he (Ho Wu) returned all the property to the son."
Tsao, Equity in Chinese Customary Law, in EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR
OF Roscoe PoUND 21, 41-42 (R. Newman ed. 1962).
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public interest ought to be left to determination by the parties
themselves."'15
Since risk and uncertainty have an economic cost,16 their re-
striction should be a goal of contract law. A finding of frustration
must be premised on the happening of an unlikely event the prob-
ability of occurrence of which cannot normally be accurately pre-
dicted. Therefore the possibility of relief through excuse may either
increase or decrease the total risk and uncertainty attached to a
transaction. 17 Such a possibility limits the ability of a party in a
strong bargaining position to restrict the variance of his own poten-
tial gains by increasing the spread of possible outcomes of those
with whom he contracts. To the extent that this restriction dis-
courages agreement, the resulting loss must be weighed against the
concomitant gain in judicial flexibility.
As currently conceived, the frustration option does not explicitly
permit a graduated response to differing equities. Since perform-
ance must be either required or excused there is generally no solu-
tion other than clear victory for one contestant.18 The cases have
permitted only an arbitrary retreat from this extreme. In the early
part of the twentieth century, the impetus provided by cases arising
15 Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Prac-
tices in International Trade, 63 CoLmvt. L, REv. 1413, 1438 (1963).
16 Risk occurs when the probability distribution over the set of pos-
sible outcomes is known. That the individual will normally prefer an un-
ambiguous solution has been frequently demonstrated. Raiffa reports, for
example, that a group of Harvard Business School students, including some
experienced executives, were willing to pay an average of only $30 for an
even chance to win $100. The highest price offered for the opportunity was
$45; the lowest only $10. A situation is labeled uncertain when the probability
distribution of possible outcomes is unknown. Here an even greater mone-
tary discount is normally demanded. Most of Raiffa's students, when of-
fered reward for selection of a ball of a designated color, either red or black,
preferred to choose from an urn containing an equal number of balls of each
color rather than from an urn containing red and black balls in unknown
proportions. Typically they would pay $35 for an opportunity to draw for
$100 from the first, but only $5 to choose from the second. Raiffa, Risk,
Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms: Comment, 75 Q.J. EcoN. 690, 693 (1961).
17 See H. Tum, EcoNo1imcs AND INfORmATION THEORy (1967).
18 "The courts have not generally matched their ingenuity in finding a
wide variety of rationales for giving relief to a frustrated party with a similar
inventiveness of forms of relief to be given. In all but three of the twenty-
nine holdings... relieving the frustrated party, the court merely declared all
rights and duties under the contract terminated by the frustrating event.
The courts appear unable to evolve any alternative to simple discharge of the
contract." Comment, Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59 Mic. L. REv. 98,
117 (1960). But see G. 'WILL A-VS, LAw REFORm (FRuSTRATED CONTRACTS) ACT
35-36 (1944); Comment, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome
Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALR L.J. 1054, 1060-69 (1960).
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from the postponement of the coronation of Edward VII because of
his illness led English courts to develop the rule that application of
frustration doctrines terminated all contract rights unaccrued at the
time of occurrence of the event warranting relief, leaving the parties
in their respective positions as of that date. Although Krel v. Hen-
ry' 9 excused the hirer of rooms above the procession path from the
duty to pay the agreed rent, Blakely v. Muller20 and Chandler v.
Webster2' determined that advance payments could not be recov-
ered and that unpaid money due before the change in circumstances
could be claimed by the prospective recipient. Defenses of these out-
comes were less than convincing:
The rule adopted ... is ... to some extent an arbitrary one, the
reason for its adoption being that it is really impossible in such
cases to work out with any certainty what the rights of the parties in
the event which has happened should be. Time has elapsed, and the
position of both parties may have been more or less altered, and it is
impossible to adjust or ascertain the rights of the parties with exacti-
tude. That being so, the law treats everything that has already been
done in pursuance of the contract as validly done, but relieves the
parties of further responsibility under it.22
The judiciary did not appear unduly disturbed by such a result:
[Tihe rule, admitted to be arbitrary, is adopted because of the diffi-
culty, nay, apparent difficulty, of reaching a solution of perfection.
Therefore, leave things alone: potior est conditio possidentis. That
maxim works well enough among tricksters, gamblers, and thieves;
let it be applied to circumstances of supervenient mishap arising from
causes outside the volition of the parties: under this application in-
nocent loss may and must be endured by the one party, and un-
earned aggrandisement may and niust be secured at his expense to
the other party. That is part of the law of England.23
Others were less tolerant: "Nothing is more startling for a lawyer
trained in a foreign system of law than the rule of English law that
in cases of supervening impossibility or 'frustration of the adven-
ture' the 'loss lies where it falls.' ",24 The doctrine, restricted by
the House of Lords in 1942,25 was finally overturned by statute
the following year.26  Its use, however, demonstrates the purpose-
lessness of frustration doctrines without acceptance of their essen-
tially redistributive function.
If excuse from performance is to be guided by principles of fair-
ness rather than by arid legal conceptualism, the economic impact on
19 [1903] 2 KB. 740 (CA.).
20 88 L.T.R. (N.S.) 90 (K.B. 1903).
21 [1904] 1 K.B. 493 (CA.).
22 Id. at 499-500.
23 Cantiare San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Eng'r Co., [1924] A.C. 226,
259.
24 R. GoTTSEA , IMPossIBILI OF PmFORmANc. iN CONTRACT 18 (1938).
25 Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbout, Ltd., [1943] A.C. 32.
26 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40 (1943).
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the contracting parties of unexpected events which raise the issue of
frustration should be closely scrutinized. While value judgments
basic to determination of the justice of possible outcomes largely
elude objective analysis, the adequacy of factual premises on which
such subjective processes operate may certainly be tested. The nor-
mal approach, that "the loss, whether great or small, must generally
fall on one party or the other,"27 is unduly simplistic. What ap-
pears to be injury when inquiry is narrowly confined may be revealed
as disguised gain to one or both parties if viewed from a broader
economic perspective. This article attempts to show that in cases
where frustration of contract is at issue, unnecessarily inadequate
economic analysis frequently leads courts to inaccurate conclusions
concerning the equity of possible solutions.
H. The Suez Canal Cases
The closing of the Suez Canal from November 2, 1956, to April 9,
1957, a result of war in the Middle East, motivated a number of
English and American decisions involving claims of frustration of
contract.28  This section will briefly describe one dispute between a
buyer and a seller of goods which would normally have moved
through the Canal if this route had been available and one dispute
between a shipowner and a charterer who had contemplated a voy-
age through the Canal.
A. Dispute Between Buyer and Seller
Albert D. Gaon & Company v. Soci~tg Interprofessionelle des
Oi6agineux Fluides Alimentaires2 9 concerned two contracts dated Oc-
tober 12, 1956, and October 31, 1956, under which Gaon agreed to
sell about 2,500 tons of unshelled Sudan groundnuts to the Soci~t6
c.i.f. Nice and Marseilles, shipment to be no later than November
1956. Prices were £49 10s. and £54 5s. per ton under the first and
second agreements respectively. Form No. 38 of the Incorporated
Oil Seed Association Forms of Contract was employed in both trans-
actions. Clause 8 of this form states:
In case of prohibition of import or export, blockade or war, epidemic.
27 Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Prac-
tices in International Trade, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1963).
28 In addition to the two cases discussed in this section, see Transatlantic
Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Glidden Co. v.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960); Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp.
v. V/O Sovfracht, [1963] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 155 (Q.B.), rev'd sub nom. The
Eugenia, [19641 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A.); Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl, G.m.b.H.,
[1960] 2 Q.B. 318 (1958), affd, [1960] 2 Q.B. 348 (C.A.), aff'd, [1962] A.C. 93
(H.L. 1961); Carapanayoti & Co. v. E.T. Green, Ltd., [1959] 1 Q.B. 131 (1958).
29 [1960] 2 Q.B. 334 (1959), affd, [1960] 2 Q.B. 348 (C.A.).
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or strike, and in all cases of force majeure preventing the shipment
within the time fixed, or the delivery, the period allowed for ship-
ment or delivery shall be extended by not exceeding two months.
After that, if the case of force majeure be still operating, the con-
tract shall be cancelled.3 0
Because of the Suez crisis no shipment was made under either
contract. A dispute between the parties as to the legal consequences
of nonperformance led to arbitration in accordance with the rules of
the Incorporated Oil Seed Association. On October 23, 1957, an
umpire, appointed after the arbitrators chosen by the parties failed to
agree, ruled that the sellers, in default under both contracts, should
pay the buyers the difference between the stipulated prices and
£62 5s. per ton, with interest at five per cent from the date of the
awards.
The sellers appealed to the Board of Appeal of the Association,
which affirmed the conclusions of the umpire. The Board of Appeal
found that closure of the Canal increased the length of the voyage
necessary for delivery from 2,300 miles to 10,500 miles. The cost of
shipment was raised from about £6 per ton to between £27 9s. and
£29 per ton.
The sellers remaining unsatisfied, the matter was taken before
the Queen's Bench in the form of a special case stated by the Board
of Appeal. The appellants argued that "shipment" as employed in
the agreements meant shipment by Suez, the usual or customary
route. Asserting the existence of an implied term that this route
would be available, they urged that enforcement of the contract
after closure of the Canal would be enforcement of a different con-
tract.
Justice Ashworth affirmed the decision of the Board. Although
he agreed that the parties contemplated shipment through the Canal,
he stated:
In the present case an unexpected event occurred, namely, the clos-
ure of the Suez Canal, and no doubt it may be said to have involved
both inconvenience and material loss. But I am not satisfied that
there was also involved such a change in the significance of the obli-
gation as would call the principle of frustration into play.81
In support of his conclusion he asserted:
[A]lthough the performance of the sellers' obligation after the closure
of the Suez Canal would have involved them in greater expense,
they would not have been performing something radically different
from that which they had undertaken to do....
• . . [T]he continued availability of the Suez Canal was not the
basis on which the parties "must have made" their bargain.3 2
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Justice
30 [1960] 2 Q.B. 334, 335 (1959).
3' Id. at 346.
S2 Id. at 347.
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Sellers first dismissed a claim for relief under clause 8: "[N] either
war nor force majeure prevented shipment of the contract goods.
Shipment means physically putting the goods on board a vessel, and,
if there was a duty on the sellers to put the contractual goods on
board a vessel for a voyage round the Cape ... there was nothing to
prevent them doing so. . .. "33 To the argument for the sellers that
if they "had shipped the contract goods via the Cape of Good Hope
whilst the Suez Canal was an available route it would have been a
breach of contract,"34 he responded:
I think the answer is that the changed circumstances gave rise to a
change in the performance of the contracts by the sellers, but it is not
so fundamental a change that it can be said to be commercially dif-
ferent or of such a character that the parties at the time of the mak-
ing of the contract, if they had considered the position, would have
said with one voice that in those circumstances their bargain would be
at an end.35
Lord Justices Ormerod and Harman concurred. The former as-
serted:
[S]hipment by the Cape route would not be a performance radically
different from that undertaken by the contract. It is true that the
distance is much greater, and the expense would be increased, par-
ticularly if shipment was delayed, as we were told that freights
were increased as time went on, but these matters of themselves are
not necessarily sufficient, in my judgment, to transform the nature of
the undertaking .... 36
The latter added: "Hardship or unexpected expense falling on one
of the parties to a commercial adventure can never excuse him from
it so long as the adventure remains recognizably that upon which the
parties embarked."3 7
B. Dispute Between Shipowner and Charterer
In Sociftg Franco Tunisienne d'Armement v. Sidermar,3 8 the
plaintiff shipowners chartered a vessel to the defendants for carriage
of iron ore from Masulipatan, on the east coast of India, to Genoa.
The charter party was dated October 18, 1956. The customary ship-
ment route at that time, through the Suez Canal, was about half the
distance of the shortest alternative route, around the Cape of Good
Hope. The captain of the chartered vessel was to telegraph Genoa
on passing the Canal.
The ship reached Masulipatan on November 9, 1956, approxi-
mately one week after the blocking of the Canal. A cargo of iron
33 [1960] 2 Q.B. 348, 359 (C.A.).
34 Id. at 362.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 367.
37 Id. at 371.
38 [1961] 2 Q.B. 278 (1960).
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ore, tendered by the charterers, was loaded with the permission of
the captain between November 13 and 18. A bill of lading was issued
on November 18, and the vessel sailed the following day. On Novem-
bar 20 the shipowners, asserting that closure of the Canal terminated
their contract, claimed an increase in freight charges from 134 to 209
shillings per long ton as compensation for the required longer jour-
ney. Since the charterers considered the shipowners still bound by
their original agreement, it was decided on December 5 that freight
should be paid at the contract rate and the dispute submitted to ar-
bitration in London. The vessel reached Genoa on February 16, 1957.
The arbitrator found that the charter party was not frustrated,
ruling that the continued availability of the Canal route was not a
basic assumption of the contract and that the voyage around the
Cape of Good Hope was not commercially or fundamentally differ-
ent from shipment via Suez. He ruled, however, that if closure had
excused performance, the claim of the shipowners was timely and
was not negated by an implied agreement to transport the cargo by
the longer route at the contract price. The charterers would then be
required to pay the shipowners the reasonable value of their services,
held to be 195 shillings per long ton.
Stated questions of law were reviewed by the Queen's Bench.
Justice Pearson, after a thorough examination of the authorities,
held the contract frustrated. That the captain was to telegraph
Genoa on passing the Canal was interpreted to imply an obligation to
travel via Suez: "[H] aving regard to the express provisions of the
contract and the surrounding circumstances, the proper view is that
it was a term of the contract (whether express or implied) that the
vessel was to go by the Suez Canal route.' 3 9 This requirement was
deemed almost determinative.
The decision was supported by a number of subordinate consid-
erations which appear to have motivated the hardly inevitable conclu-
sions concerning "the true construction of the contract": 40
[T]here is the simple geography of the matter. The route by way of
the Suez Canal is a fairly direct route .... But the route via the
Cape is a highly circuitous route .... It is a route which no sensi-
ble person would take. ... [Ilt is an unnatural route.
... There was the extra expense of going via the Cape. There
was the extra journey in distance; the extra time; and the different
climatic conditions, which would not affect a cargo of iron ore, but
might have some effect on the vessel's crew.
t . [H] aving regard to the express provisions of the contract and
the surrounding circumstances, the proper view is that it was a term
of the contract (whether express or implied) that the vessel was to go
89 Id. at 306.
40 Id.
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by the Suez Canal route.
. [I] t would be a fundamentally different voyage.41
Although there was no relevant express finding by the arbitrator,
Justice Pearson commented: "I am rather inclined to infer that the
rate of 134s. per long ton was the appropriate rate for the Suez Canal
voyage .... ,,42
Gaon was distinguished:
One may say shortly that it is obvious that the position is very
different in a contract for the sale of goods .... The seller would
put the goods on board the ship at the port of loading as contem-
plated by the contract, and the buyer would receive the goods at the
port of discharge as contemplated by the contract. The only differ-
ences would be that the seller would pay more than he expected for
the freight and the buyer would have to wait longer than he expected
to receive the goods. It was considered by the Court of Appeal that
these were not fundamental differences, and there was no frustration
in the case of a c.i.f. contract.43
Since the court found that the actions of the shipowners did not
preclude their assertion of frustration, it ruled that they were en-
titled on the basis of quantum meruit to reasonable freight for the
extended voyage, as previously fixed by arbitration. Arguments of
equity were summarily dismissed: "[I]f there was hardship on the
charterers, it arose really from the frustrating event and not from
any fault of the shipowners. .... 44
C. Criticism
Controlling authority hardly dictated the conclusions of Gaon and
Sidermar. The rules of law applied appear to be less guides for de-
cision than rationalizations of outcomes determined on other grounds.
Certainly in each case the court could easily have found for the los-
ing party. In Gaon, the Queen's Bench was confronted with Cara-
panayoti & Company v. E. T. Green, Ltd.,45 in which Justice McNair
had ruled a contract frustrated under similar circumstances. The
Gaon court stated:
In reaching this conclusion I am regretfully conscious that I am
differing from that reached by McNair, J., and although the facts
found in the present case are not precisely the same as those before
him, I doubt whether on this point the differences are such as to
afford any firm basis for distinguishing his case from this.46
41 Id. at 304-05, 306-07.
42 Id. at 305.
43 Id. at 308.
44 Id. at 312.
45 [1959] 1 Q.B. 131 (1958).
46 Albert D. Gaon & Co. v. Soci~t6 Interprofessionelle des O16agineux
Fluides Alimentaires, [1960] 2 Q.B. 334, 347 (1959).
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The Court of Appeal has likewise found Green unreconcilable
47
and has expressly disapproved Sidermar in its reversal of a similar
decision.48  In the latter case, Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls,
said:
The only hestitation I have had about this case is because of the
views expressed by Pearson J. in The Massalia [Sidermar]. That case
can be distinguished because there was a sentence in the charter
which read "Captain also to telegraph to 'Maritsider Genoa' on pass-
ing Suez Canal." Pearson J. held that that meant there was actually
an obligation to pass the Suez Canal, and hence the contract was
frustrated by impossibility. I think he attached too much significance
to the clause. I think that there, as here, there was no obligation to
go through the Suez Canal, but only to go by the route which was
customary at the time of performance .... Pearson J. held that the
route via the Cape was fundamentally different from the route via
the Suez Canal and that the charter was frustrated on that ground
also. I am afraid I cannot take that view....
I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the decision of Pearson
J. in The Massalia was wrong and should be overruled.
49
The manifest inconclusiveness of doctrinal considerations should
have freed the courts to seek other grounds for decision. Inquiry
into the equities of the contesting parties was stifled, however, by
judicial unwillingness to view broadly the economic consequences
of closure of the Suez Canal. It was obvious that the law could have
little impact on the magnitude of the social costs associated with the
disruption of normal trade routes. The judges were thus correct in
viewing their function as primarily allocative. They were wrong,
however, in believing that the loss resulting from nonshipment or an
extended voyage must inevitably fall on the contracting parties. This
unwarranted assumption, together with the lack of precedent support-
ing a division of the presumed loss, led them to conclude that one or
the other of the equally innocent parties, selected almost arbitrarily,
must suffer substantial injury. It is not surprising that the desire
for justice did not evoke enthusiasm for any outcome.
That closure of the Canal imposed a cost on society cannot be
disputed. This does not mean, however, that the parties directly af-
fected necessarily bear the total loss. In both Gaon and Sidermar,
47 Lord Justice Sellers declared: "I agree with the view of Ashworth, J.
and regret that it is contrary to the view taken by a very experienced com-
mercial judge, McNair J., in very similar circumstances in Green's case."
Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl, G.m.b.H., [1960] 2 Q.B. 348, 363 (C.A.).
Lord Justice Harman concurred: "I must face the fact that this involves
disagree with the decision of McNair J. in Green's case, for I cannot see any
distinction between that case and this. Both arise out of the same events;
both concern c.i.f. contracts, and, though the form of the contracts and their
dates differ to some extent, I do not think the differences are relevant."
Id. at 371-72.
48 The Eugenia, [1964] 2 Q.B. 238 (C.A.).
49 Id. at 40-41.
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for example, the contracting parties may have been able to shift part
or all of the economic loss initially falling on them to groups not be-
fore the court. In the latter case, one cannot exclude the possibility
of an overshift of the injury to the owner and the charterer which
would have permitted them to secure joint advantages in spite of the
injury to society as a whole. Given this spectrum of potential out-
comes, judicial resolution of these disputes cannot correctly be viewed
as simply determining which of the contestants must suffer loss. It
is conceivable, for example, that the court through skillful exploita-
tion of the flexibility provided by the issue of frustration could have
approximately satisfied the expectations held by the contracting par-
ties prior to the unanticipated disruption of their ventures. At the
very least, therefore, the decisions under consideration were inade-
quately supported.
IMI. Analysis
A. General Equilibrium Model
The impact on world commerce and markets of an unanticipated
closing of the Suez Canal may be rapidly summarized. The trans-
portation sector of the world economy will experience alterations in
patterns of ship demand, freight rates per ton-mile, and total trans-
portation costs per unit of goods shipped. Ship demand will be
determined by interaction between the matrix of trip distances, which
has received the initial shock of Canal closure, and matrices of prod-
uct supply and demand functions. Changes in freight rates per ton-
mile will be induced by interplay between ship supply functions and
altered ship demand. Total transportation costs will reflect the effects
of changed freight rates per ton-mile and trip distance increases, if
any.
These consequences can be represented symbolically.50
Data:
Qi = matrix of trip distances
Q2 = matrix of world producer supply functions
Q3= matrix of world consumer demand
Q4 = matrix of ship supply functions
Variables:
X = ship demand matrix
X2= matrix of freight rates per ton-mile
X3 = matrix of transportation costs per unit of product
50 See R. KUENNE, THE THEORY OF GENAL EcoNoMIc EQu=iRBium (1963);
Simon, Causal Ordering and Identifiability, in A. ANno, F. FIsHM & H. SIMON,
ESSAYS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE MODELS 5 (1963).
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We have posited three functional relationships:
X, = F, (Qi, Q2, Q8)
X2 = F2 (X1; Q)
X3 ='F(X 2; Qj)
If we assume these equations are continuous and differentiable, we
may derive the changes in the variables resulting from the shock to
Qi of the closing of the Canal from the following system:
1 0 0 ?X BiSQ1  SQ-
SF 2  _X2 0x-7 1 0 -- = 0
0 Ss IX 3  BF3
1 X ?Q-'i SQI
Similar techniques may be used to compute the change in profit-
ability of individual transactions as a result of closure of the Canal.
The restructured matrix of transportation costs per unit of product
may for this purpose be taken as data. Supply price and demand
price matrices depend on producer supply and consumer demand
functions and transportation charges. Profit or loss from trade in
any goods between any two points is in turn determined by the
schedules of supply and demand prices and transportation charges.
Several additional definitions are now required.
Data:
Q5 = X3 = matrix of transportation costs per unit of product
Variables:
X4 = matrix of producer supply prices
X5 - matrix of consumer demand prices
X6 = trade profitability matrix
Three more relationships may now be described:
X4 = F 4 (Q5, Q2, Q8)
X5 - F6 (Qr, Q2, Qs)
X6 = F6(X4, X5; Q5)
Again assuming that the functions are continuous and differentiable,
we may as above obtain the changes in the variables caused by the
change in Qr, itself a product of Canal closure:
1 X4 r F4
100 5Q5Q
0 1 0 ZX5 - F5
SFG SF6  I FX6SF
1x4 -x BQ- ?5
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We may combine the two systems already developed into a single
comprehensive system simultaneously determining changes in ship
demand, transportation costs, product prices, and trade profitability
resulting from shifts in the matrix of trip distances:
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 3Q--0
0 0 1 0 0 0 Q--'B"
0 0 B4 1 0 0 ZXQi
0 0 F5 0 1 0 X5BX3 ? Q---1
0 0 BF6 ZF6 Fi 1 X6 0X3 )X4 ZX5 Q
B. Interpretation
Given the pattern of interactions, it is possible to estimate the
economic consequences of closure of the Canal. While lack of data
precludes precise determination of the rates of change of the variables
involved, we may with little danger of error establish the qualitative
impact of the posited shock. Our conclusions, supported by em-
pirical evidence, will provide a basis for later, more thorough exami-
nation of Gaon and Sidermar.
It is clear that after the shock each element in the trip distance
matrix Q, will be either unchanged or greater than before: Blocking
of the Canal can affect a voyage only by making it longer. It does
not necessarily follow, however, that ship demand schedules will
shift outward. The need for transportation services, X1, is a function
not only of the length of trade routes but also of the amount of com-
merce along these routes; the parameter sets Q2 and Q3 also play a
role. If the demand for goods which would formerly have been
shipped via Suez is quite elastic, perhaps because a slight increase in
their prices in consuming nations will evoke substantial response by
domestic or other nearby suppliers, it is possible that the stimulus to
ship demand resulting from the necessity of travel around Africa
will be more than offset by a reduction in the quantity of goods re-
quired from supply sources from which such shipment has become
necessary. Such a consequence is nevertheless highly unlikely; we
may in general expect the changes in trip distances to produce a
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dramatic increase in the demand for ships at given levels of freight
rates.
The revised ship demand schedules will interact with Q4, the ship
supply schedules, to determine X2, the matrix of freight rates per
ton-mile. Especially in the short run, which is of primary interest
for our purposes, the matrix Q4 will remain essentially uninfluenced
by Canal closure. Over periods of a year or less, ship supply should'
be relatively inelastic: Although some retired tonnage can be pressed
into service, a significant interval is required to plan and build new
vessels. Therefore, assuming that decision units are free to respond
to market forces,51 it is likely that the posited outward shift of
the demand functions will lead to substantial increases in freight
rates per ton-mile. Given the magnitude of this increase and the new
matrix of trip distances, we may easily compute X 3, the matrix of
charges for shipping various goods between different points. Such
costs will rise for most goods transported by water whether or not
formerly routed via Suez. The expense of shipping goods which once
would have been carried through the Canal, however, will increase
not only because of higher freight rates but also because of the
greater distances now involved.
Consumers will pay more for most products as a result of Canal
closure if, as seems almost inevitable, demand schedules are not per-
fectly elastic. The prices of goods which would have been shipped
51 But see Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HAV. L. REv.
635 (1965). Apparent deviations from the norm are frequent: "[T]he
freight rate for lumber shipped from Mexico to Venezuela was $24 per ton
in 1963 as compared to $11 from Finland to Venezuela, even though the
distance is three times greater. From Buenos Aires to Tampico, Mexico,
the ocean freight rate for chemicals was $54 per ton for direct shipment;
but if the goods were trans-shipped in New Orleans the rate was only $46,
while trans-shipment in Southampton brought down the rate further to $40,
despite the tremendous increase in distances involved." S. DELL, A LATNW
AMmicA COMMvON MARKET? 101 (1966).
Difficulties are not confined to cost disparities: "Goods shipped from Porto
Alegre in Brazil to Montevideo actually reach their destination more quickly
if sent via Hamburg, Western Germany. In fact Uruguayan wool is shipped
to the United States by way of Hamburg even when there are ships avail-
able going directly to New York." Id. Such seeming distortions of market
processes have venerable antecedents: "Buenos Aires, on an estuary leading
immediately to the Atlantic, and facing Spain across the ocean without any
intervening obstacles, was forced to conduct all its trade via Lima, the vice-
regal capital of Peru, so that Lima would derive the exclusive benefits; this
meant that goods had to be shipped by mule across the Andes to Lima, all the
way from the Atlantic to the Pacific and in the precisely wrong direction, then
up the Pacific coast by sea to Panama, then across the isthmus by land, then
by sea once more to Spain. It was as if-today-Chicago had to trade with
New York via San Francisco and Alaska." J. GuNTHER, INSIDME SoUTH AMERICA
115 (1966).
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via Suez and which are without close substitutes or adequate alterna-
tive sources of supply will increase most substantially. Since the
cost of transportation by water will rise, however, imports normally
sent by routes not utilizing the Canal will in general also become
more expensive. Resulting shifts in demand should induce price in-
creases in many goods produced for domestic consumption. Stimu-
lated demand for certain products-primarily those not directly af-
fected by higher transportation charges-will raise the prices paid to
some suppliers. Since demand may be expected to fall for most of
the goods made more expensive by increased freight costs, however,
we should expect declines in the prices paid to producers of imports,
Positive changes will predominate in the matrix X4; the elements of
X5 can vary in either direction. Trade profitability, X6, can be de-
termined by comparing the revised schedules of transportation costs
with the differences between the new equilibrium consumer demand
and producer supply prices. In general, shipowners will make large
gains at the expense of suppliers and especially consumers.
C. Confirmation
Many of the conclusions of this analysis are supported by the
economic impact on the petroleum industry of the disruption of Canal
traffic caused by conflict between Israel and the Arab states in 1967.
Western Europe normally receives 4.4 million barrels of oil per day,
52 percent of its requirements, from countries of the Middle East.
While pipelines carry some of this output directly to ports at the
eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, most must be transported by
tanker either via Suez or around the Cape of Good Hope. Opening
of fields in Libya and Algeria, now together supplying an additional
2.1 million barrels per day, has reduced but not eliminated this de-
pendence. The Canal itself, which cannot accommodate loaded tank-
ers above 80,000 deadweight tons, 52 has become, however, a less im-
portant artery even for shipment of Middle East petroleum: The ex-
pense of carriage of a ton of crude from Kuwait to Rotterdam can
presently be reduced 34 percent below the lowest cost via Suez by the
use of 200,000 ton vessels rounding Africa when loaded but going
through the Canal on ballasted return voyages. The projected em-
ployment of 300,000 ton tankers routed around the Cape both out-
bound and inbound will cut costs to half those via Suez, and con-
struction of much larger ships is contemplated.
Closing of the Canal nevertheless greatly increased the demand
52 "Deadweight tonnage expresses a ship's total carrying capacity, in-
cluding crew, provisions, and bunker fuel. Actual cargo capacity is slightly
less than that-e.g., a 50,000-deadweight-ton tanker can lift about 47,000 tons
of crude." FoRTuNE, Sept. 1, 1967, at 80, 85.
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for tankers:
The reason for the squeeze is simple. Western Europe's supplies
traditionally come by tanker through Suez from the Mideast-where
crude prices are the cheapest-in a standard Persian Gulf-to-Rotter-
dam round trip of 42 days. The route around the Cape of Good Hope
is 50 per cent longer, averaging 65 or more days round-trip. Thus
... the need for tanker capacity on the European run has been in-
creased by exactly one-half.5
3
Although supply was relatively responsive,54 prices rose dramatic-
ally:
Short-term charter rates quickly shot up by a factor of six, climbing
to their highest levels since the last Suez crisis in 1956 .... Not
long before the Middle East fighting broke out, the spot-charter rate
for lifting a ton of crude from ports in the Persian Gulf to northern
Europe (e.g., Rotterdam) stood at a rock-bottom low of about $2.90-
or 70 percent below Intascale, the international standard that is used
as a yardstick for quoting charter rates. But within two weeks it
shot up to Intascale plus 70 percent, or about $18.60 for a Persian
Gulf-Northern Europe voyage around the cape. Worse, from the
standpoint of the oil companies, shipowners were not chartering for
one voyage, but held out for two or more consecutive runs.55
Gains to shipowners were enormous:
[S]hipping Tycoons ... stood to harvest $250 million in extra
profits on ship charters signed since the canal was closed....
[T]he charter by Standard Oil of New Jersey of Stavros Niar-
chos's modern 90,000-ton S.S. Philip S. Niarchos for two round trips
to Europe is typical. The charter price, for roughly four months'
work, was $3.2 million. After payment of all costs, fully $2.5 mil-
lion of that will be net profit, according to brokers.56
The loss to oil companies, acting as both suppliers and marketers,
was expected to be substantial:
Just about every major international oil company took a violent fi-
nancial buffeting, which is certain to be reflected in their earnings.
53 NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1967, at 70.
54 "This immense upsurge, luckily, came at a time when a good deal
of the world's fleet of 5,453 tankers, capable of carrying 110 million tons of
oil, was not being used. About 1.3 million tons of tankers were laid up and
hundreds of other vessels were being employed to carry ore, grain and other
bulk dry cargoes just to keep going." Id. "All together, about 200 tankers,
totaling some five million deadweight tons, returned to the newly lucrative
oil trade." FORTUNE, Sept. 1, 1967, at 80, 85., Nevertheless only about 10 per-
cent of total tanker capacity was available for charter on the open market.
Id. at 80.
55 Id. Rates above this level have been recorded. 'The highest known
rate was a charter by Soponata, a Spanish refinery, of a 28,000-ton tanker at
$28 a ton." NnwswmEi, July 17, 1967, at 70.
56 NEwswEEK, July 17, 1967, at 70, 73; see FORTUNE, Sept. 1, 1967, at
80: "[lIt takes no computer to figure the dimensions of their windfall. A
reasonably efficient 80,000-deadweight-ton tanker chartered at Intascale plus
70 percent nets about $1 million for each voyage around the cape. At the pre-
war rate of Intascale minus 70 percent, the same vessel could barely break
even."
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Worst hit of them all was British Petroleum.... [S]hipping ex-
perts estimate the crisis will cost the company at least $280 million.
For the oil industry as a whole, they place the cost in the vicinity of
$1 billion.5
7
Much of the burden, however, appears to have been shifted to
the consumer. An August 1967 report asserted: "Price increases
for motor gasoline and light fuel oils in Western Europe are expected
to cover the added costs now being incurred because of higher
transportation outlays due to the closing of the Suez Canal."58 The
retail price of gasoline rose 2% cents per gallon in Britain, 1 cent per
gallon in France, and from 2 to 3 cents per gallon in Holland, and
Sweden.59 "In Germany, gasoline prices had been raised five times
by mid-August-about a penny a gallon each time."60  Earnings dur-
ing 1967 of the five international oil companies based in the United
States were an average of 7.6 percent above 1966 levels.61
D. Application
The economic framework introduced in the preceding sections per-
mits consideration of the Gaon and Sidermar cases from a fresh per-
spective. Although we remain unable to derive unassailable criteria
for resolution of the disputes involved, we can at least outline the
probable consequences of alternative holdings and designate those
questions important for decision which were neither asked nor an-
swered. Our primary goal is to focus attention on a dimension of
the typical frustration problem which has received inadequate treat-
ment because lawyers are not trained to recognize its existence.
In Gaon, the plaintiffs sold unshelled groundnuts to the defend-
ants c.i.f. Nice and Marseilles for £49 10s. and £54 5s. per ton under
contracts of October 12, 1956, and October 31, 1956, respectively.
Presumably the risk of closing of the Canal was not consciously al-
located by the parties, although the higher price in the second agree-
ment, made after fighting had broken out in the Middle East, may
reflect a realization of the possibility of disruption of normal trade
57 FORTUNz, Sept. 1, 1967, at 80.
58 FiANciAL WORLD, Aug. 16, 1967, at 9. Albert L. Nickerson, Chairman
of the Mobil Oil Company, stated: "Now, in the Eastern Hemisphere it is
true that we've had tremendous supply problems that have been brought
about by the Middle East war. But as far as Mobil is concerned, we really
have gone a very long way to compensate for those additional costs through
increased prices abroad." FORBES, Jan. 1, 1968, at 156.
59 NEwswEEK, July 17, 1967, at 70.
60 FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1967, at 31, 38.
61 -FORBES, Jan. 1, 1968, at 156: "War in the Middle East, where the
world's largest oil reserves are located, affected the oil business last year.
Surprisingly, however, earnings were up sharply in the wake of the disruption,
and the benefits following the crisis far outweighed the disadvantages."
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routes. Loss to the parties jointly in the first instance can be meas-
ured by the change in transportation charges, which rose from about
£6 per ton to between £27 9s. and £29 per ton. The increase of between
£21 9s. and £23, apparently conservatively estimated, should have been
a product both of extension of the required voyage from 2,300 miles to
10,500 miles and of higher freight rates per ton-mile.
Let us assume that the buyer had planned resale but had made
no unavoidable commitment to a purchaser. Damages of £12 15s. and
£8 per ton were awarded under the first and second contracts respect-
tively. If nonspeculative return to the buyer is disregarded, and if
the indicated increase in the market price of groundnuts is assumed a
result of the Suez crisis, it would appear that a substantial part of
the burden of additional transportation costs, in the first case more
than 50 percent, had been shifted from the parties to the consumer.
6 2
If the price in the first contract, £49 10s., represented the worth of
groundnuts in Southern France before uncertainty as to the avail-
ability of the Canal route, shipment as agreed in it would have re-
sulted in an unanticipated joint loss of between £8 14s. and £10 5s.
per ton: The cost of higher freight rates would have been partially
offset by the concomitant rise in the market price of groundnuts. A
finding of frustration after performance, leading to reimbursement of
the seller for the increased transportation charges, would have thrust
all of this loss on the buyer. On the other hand, if performance
were not excused, canal closure would have damaged the seller by the
amount of the change in freight costs while yielding an unexpected
gain to the buyer equal to the consequent adjustment in the price of
groundnuts.
The goods, however, were never shipped. If the contracts had
been deemed frustrated, the loss to the seller would have been the
reduction in value of the groundnuts in the Sudan, an amount
which could not have exceeded £10 5s. per ton if the first agreement
is used as a base. It appears unlikely that markets not normally
supplied by water were sufficiently extensive to reduce significantly
the level of injury.63 By refusing to excuse performance the courts
added to this loss of the seller the increase in the European value of
the groundnuts, the unanticipated profit which the buyer would have
62 During 1958-1960 Nigeria and Senegal respectively supplied 37 per-
cent and 23 percent of world groundnut exports. Three other West African
states accounted for an added 11 percent. EcoNoMIsT INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
OxroRD EcoNomVuc ATLAs OF Tn Woaw 43 (3d ed. 1965). Canal closure would
thus affect European groundnut prices largely by increasing freight rates per
ton-mile.
63 Nine European countries purchased 82 percent of all groundnuts
internationally traded in 1958-1960. France alone received 35 percent of
world imports. Id.
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made had the contract been performed. Since the sum of the abso-
lute values of the Sudanese and European price changes should equal
the increase in transportation charges, nonshipment alters the result
only by imposing the joint loss on the seller rather than on the
buyer when frustration is found.
In either situation resolution of the frustration issue does more
than allocate the unanticipated loss: Alternative outcomes also yield
different distributions of the expected joint return from agreement.
If closure was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of contracting and the buyer could resell at the new market price,
the damages awarded need not be considered a loss which must be
suffered by one party or the other, but can be viewed as evidence of a
shifting of part of their joint injury to the consumer. Thus, if be-
cause of the unforeseen event the'price of the goods at the point of
delivery had risen exactly enough to offset the resulting increase in
transportation charges, a finding of frustration after performance
would have allowed exact fulfillment of the expectations of both
buyer and seller. The transfer payment from consumer to carrier
would have had no impact on the parties before the court. In Gaon
the refusal to hold the agreement frustrated dictated an award of
damages measured essentially by the extent to which the parties were
able to shift their loss forward. Such a result is nonsensical. Even
if lost profit is here deemed injury, however, the judges, through
excusing performance and thereby thrusting the burden on the buyer,
could have divided the total injury almost equally.
In Sidermar, Justice Pearson found a charter party for carriage
of iron ore from India to Italy frustrated by closure of the Canal.
He thus awarded the shipowners, who, having transported the ore
around the Cape of Good Hope, sought the reasonable value of their
services, freight at 195s. per long ton, 61s. per long ton more than
the compensation stipulated by contract. The modest difference
between the contract rate and 209s. per long ton, the sum claimed to
be the reasonable value for a voyage about twice as long as originally
contemplated, probably reflects restraint on the part of the plaintiff;
it is possible but unlikely that blocking of the Canal did not substan-
tially alter demand for the type of ship chartered or that the rate
initially agreed upon reflected uncertainty as to the future availability
of the customary route.
In this case only a relatively small portion of the loss incurred by
the parties through the necessity of a longer voyage could have been
shifted forward to the consumer: Since Europe itself produced sub-
stantial quantities of iron ore,64 elimination of the Suez route
64 Iron ore exports by France and Sweden during 1958-1960 were 16
percent and 13 percent of world totals respectively. Id. at 77.
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should not have caused a very great increase in price. Thus faced
with what he considered the unpleasant task of thrusting the injury
on one of two equally blameless parties, Justice Pearson, by excusing
performance, elected to favor the shipowners over the charterers.
Within the narrow framework of the dispute before the court, his
decision appears as rational as its alternative.
If the transaction in question is for the moment disregarded, how-
ever, it seems likely that closing of the Canal, while causing some
loss to the defendants, significantly benefited the plaintiffs. We have
seen that strengthened demand for transportation services greatly
increased both freight rates and shipowner profits. The plaintiffs
perhaps owned more than one ship. Moreover, since the chartered
vessel reached Genoa on February 16, 1957, almost two months be-
fore the Canal was reopened, it presumably could have been re-
chartered at a high rate. The court therefore chose to save free of
loss, with respect to the transaction before it, a party which overall
might well have received windfall gain from the happening of an
event deemed so unexpected as to warrant a finding of frustration.
Although expansion of the scope of inquiry to include such consider-
ations is arguably inexpedient, the formulae the court invoked do not
alone justify its decision.
IV. Conclusion
Cases involving the problem of excuse for nonperformance of con-
tractual obligations are generally viewed as requiring the allocation
of an indisputable loss due to an unanticipated event to one of two
innocent parties. Since principles of justice hardly dictate the out-
come when the issue is framed in this manner, courts support their
seemingly almost fortuitous conclusions primarily by appealing to the
pretended inevitability of legal logic. Although situations conform-
ing to the prototype of course arise, the facts underlying disputes
concerning frustration are typically much more complex than judges
normally realize.
This article seeks to demonstrate that a deeper probing of the
economic consequences of the unexpected occurrence forming the
basis of claims of frustration will frequently lead to revised cal-
culations concerning the amount of resulting gain or loss and of-
fer new guidelines for its distribution. In Gaon, for example, the
evidence of price rises, employed simply to compute the damages
which the buyer was required to pay for breach of his agreement,
could more fruitfully have served to show that loss from increased
transportation charges initially falling on the buyer and the seller
had been in part shifted forward to the consumer. In Sidermar, on
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the other hand, the court, by finding frustration of a charter party,
absolved from loss, with respect to the transaction before it, ship-
owners who possibly reaped substantial overall gain from the unex-
pected event which excused their performance.
